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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOBBY REFORM:
IMPLICATING ASSOCIATIONAL PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT
TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT
Lobbyists currently are required to register and report to the United States
Congress under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946. Because of poor
draftsmanship, the 1946 Act actually covers few lobbyists and is not enforced by
the federal government. One recent federal bill attempts to reform lobbying regis-
tration by addressing the inadequacies of the current law. If enacted, this bill
might be challenged as an impediment to First Amendment rights. Any attempt at
lobby reform implicates the First Amendment right to petition the government and
the right of associational privacy. These issues have been analyzed by state and
federal courts in cases representing challenges to lobbying regulations. An analyt-
ical framework can be extracted from these cases which offers the most desirable
method of balancing individual liberties with the need for lobbying regulation. The
recent federal bill is analyzed under this framework and practical solutions are
offered to help ensure the constitutionality of future attempts at lobby reform.
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual
members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the
myriad pressures to which they are regularly subjected. Yet
full realization of the American ideal of government by elect-
ed representatives depends to no small extent on their ability
to properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise the voice of
the people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of
special interest groups seeking favored treatment while mas-
querading as proponents of the public weal. This is the evil
which the Lobbying Act was designed to help prevent.'
The Supreme Court thus described the purpose of the Federal Regulation
of Lobbying Act of 1946.2 Ironically, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Act resulted in a law with little efficacy.3 Ostensibly requiring lobbyists
to register with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary
of the Senate,4 the Act is little more than a guideline for voluntary compli-
ance.5 Although Congress occasionally has endeavored to revise the debili-
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
2 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1994).
See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
4 2 U.S.C. §§ 264, 267.
5 See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, CONGRESS AND PRESSURE
GROUPS: LOBBYING IN A MODERN DEMOCRACY, S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
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tated Act,6 no proposal to revise federal lobbying disclosure has yet been
enacted.
In the final days of the 103rd Congress, a bill failed to pass that would
have reformed federal regulation of lobbying activities.7 Because a similar
bill could pass in the 104th Congress,' the constitutional implications of
regulation of lobbyists should be examined. This Note will address only the
freedom of association and right to petition the government issues raised by
such a bill.9
The Note first will discuss the history and contents of Senate Bill 1060,
including the justification for lobby reform. Next, the Note will analyze two
constitutional issues that would be implicated by passage of Senate Bill
1060 or a similar lobbying reform bill. The first issue is the explicit First
Amendment right to petition the government." The second issue is the
freedom of association, implicit in the First Amendment.1' The analysis
will include an examination of challenges to both state and federal statutes
and regulations that affect lobbyists. The Note then will examine the policy
considerations underlying lobby reform. These considerations involve bal-
ancing the need to prevent undue legislative influences and the appearance
of impropriety with the individual's right to petition the government. The
Note also will recommend the best ways to ensure a lobby reform bill's
constitutionality while preserving its purpose. Finally, the possibility of a
new judicial test for the First Amendment right to petition the government
in the context of lobby reform will be addressed.
52 (1986) [hereinafter S. REP. NO. 161]. The Department of Justice, charged with en-
forcing the Act, has "shifted the focus of its principal efforts from prosecution to pro-
moting voluntary compliance by bringing the act to the attention of those to whom it is
potentially applicable." Id.
6 See id. at 46-50.
S. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
8 Senate Bill 349 was reintroduced in the 104th Congress as Senate Bill 1060. On
July 25, 195, Senate Bill 1060 passed the Senate by a vote of 98-0. Helen Dewar &
Michael Weisskopf, Senate Backs Tighter Lobby Rules: Floor Action Deferred on Mea-
sure Banning Gifts to Law Makers, WASH. POST, July 26, 1995, at A4.
9 Other constitutional issues implicated by the bill may include the Establishment
Clause, Free Exercise Clause, privacy, and vagueness. See Letter from Laura Murphy
Lee, Director, American Civil Liberties Union, to Members of the United States Senate
1-4 (Oct. 5, 1994) (on file with author).
1o U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging... the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.").
" Id. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding constitutionality
of The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (recognizing right to freedom of association).
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I. LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1995
A. Existing Law
1. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946
Before examining the need for lobby reform, one must understand how
the existing law applies to lobbyists. Congress and the states recognized the
need for lobby reform as early as the nineteenth century, 2 although com-
prehensive federal lobby reform legislation did not pass until 1946."3 The
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 (the Act) 4 is a poorly consid-
ered law based on little prior debate." The legislation's inferior draftsman-
ship and subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court resulted in an
ineffective law.
The language of the Act fails to cover a wide range of persons who
might be considered lobbyists. The Act defines a lobbyist as:
any person ... who by himself, or through any agent or
employee or other persons in any manner whatsoever, di-
rectly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or receives money or
any other thing of value to be used principally to aid, or the
principal purpose of which person is to aid in .... [t]he
passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the
United States ... [or t]o influence, directly or indirectly, the
passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the
United States.
6
The first gap in coverage is the Act's failure to cover grassroots lobby-
ists. 7 The Act also only covers persons who attempt to influence congres-
12 In 1876, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution requiring lobbyists to
register with the Clerk of the House. S. REP. No. 161, supra note 5, at 5. This reso-
lution was effective only for the 44th Congress. Id. Meanwhile, several states had
criminalized the act of lobbying. Id.
'3 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 839-42
(codified in 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1994)).
2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1994).
's SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT OF
1993, S. REP. No. 37, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 37].
16 2 U.S.C. § 266.
" Grassroots lobbying is lobbying by attempting to solicit other people to lobby the
government directly. See S. REP. NO. 37, supra note 15, at 4 n.3. This definition should
not be confused with the actual contacts made by constituents with their congressional
1995] 719
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sional legislation.'8 This limitation permits lobbyists who attempt to influ-
ence executive branch and administrative decisions to avoid registration
requirements.' 9 The scope of the Act is further narrowed by the require-
ment that the lobbyist's "principal purpose" be to influence legislation."
This language permits lobbyists to use creative time-accounting techniques
to argue that influencing legislation is not their "principal purpose," thus
permitting most lobbyists to avoid the Act's coverage.2'
Lobbyists covered by the Act are required to comply with the registra-
tion requirements. Lobbyists must register with the Secretary of the Senate
and the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 2 The information that must
be disclosed in the registration includes:
representatives. The definition of grassroots lobbying given in the original Senate Bill
349 and the accompanying report clearly intends the bill to cover only the former ac-
tivity. See S. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(8) (1994); S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15,
at 3.
The Senate report accompanying Senate Bill 349 suggests that the Act's failure to
cover grassroots lobbying is attributable to the statutory language requiring those cov-
ered by the Act to lobby for compensation. S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 4 n.3.
Few, however, could argue that lobbyists who initiate letter campaigns receive or solicit
funds for their services. A better explanation of the Act's failure to cover grassroots
lobbyists is the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act. See infra note 32 and accom-
panying text. Regardless of the reason, most commentators agree that grassroots lobby-
ists are excluded from the Act's coverage. LELAND J. BADGER, FEDERAL LOBBYING 6
(Jerald A. Jacobs ed., 1989).
Grassroots lobbying, as defined in Senate Bill 349, is a significant component of a
modem lobbying campaign. See Lobbying Disclosure Legislation: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995), available in 1995 WL 331868 [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Joan
Claybrook, President, Public Citizen). Campaigns & Elections magazine estimated that
nearly $800 million was spent on grassroots lobbying at the federal, state, and local
levels during 1993 and 1994. Id. The magazine listed over 100 private companies that
offer grassroots lobbying services. Id.
IS 2 U.S.C. § 266.
,9 S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 3.
20 2 U.S.C. § 266.
2 Recent statistics show that only 6000 lobbyists out of 60,000 to 80,000 working in
the Washington, D.C. area registered under the Act. William P. Fuller, Congressional
Lobbying Disclosure Laws: Much Needed Reforms on the Horizon, 17 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 419, 427 (1993). Some entities charged with enforcing the Act take the cyni-
cal view that compliance with the Act is completely discretionary. The Clerk of the
House of Representatives testified that because "he had no power to enforce the [A]ct,
his office was merely a depository for information for anyone who wanted to file." S.
REP. No. 161, supra note 5, at 51. The Department of Justice focuses not on prosecu-
tion under the Act, but on promoting voluntary compliance. Id. at 52.
22 2 U.S.C. § 267.
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his name and business address, the name and address of the
person by whom he is employed, and in whose interest he
appears or works, the duration of such employment, how
much he is paid and is to receive, by whom he is paid or is
to be paid, how much he is to be paid for expenses, and
what expenses are to be included.23
Additionally, lobbyists must file quarterly reports with the Clerk of the
House and the Secretary of the Senate. These reports must include:
a detailed report under oath of all money received and ex-
pended by him ... in carrying on his work; to whom paid;
for what purposes; and the names of any papers, periodicals,
magazines or other publications in which he has caused to be
published any articles or editorials; and the proposed legisla-
tion he is employed to support or oppose.24
The Act requires an additional report to be filed quarterly with the Clerk
of the House of Representatives. 5 This report must include: (1) the name
and address of contributors of morie than $500 to the lobbyist; (2) the
amount of the contributions; and (3) a detailed account of expenditures
made on behalf of contributors.26
2. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Act
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Harriss,27 examined the consti-
tutionality of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. In Harriss, the defen-
dants were charged with criminally violating the Act by failing to register as
lobbyists and report contributions and expenditures.28 Determining the va-
lidity of the Act on its face, the Court first examined whether it was uncon-
stitutionally vague." In examining the vagueness issue, the Court held that
the Act, by its terms, covered only persons "who solicit, collect, or receive
contributions of money or other thing[s] of value, and then only if 'the
principal purpose' of either the persons or the contributions" is to influence
23 Id.
24 Id.
21 Id. § 264.
26 Id.
27 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
21 Id. at 613-17.
29 Id. at 617.
1995]
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legislation." Thus, the Act's coverage was limited to those who lobby for
compensation.
Next, the Court examined whether the type of activity covered by the
Act made the Act unconstitutionally vague. The Court read the Act's cover-
age as to apply only to "lobbying in its commonly accepted sense...
[namely,] direct communication with members of Congress on pending or
proposed federal legislation."'" The Court thus restricted the coverage of
the Act to lobbyists who communicate directly with members of Con-
gress-a requirement not found in the Act's language.32
Finally, the Court addressed whether the meaning of "principal purpose"
rendered the Act unconstitutionally vague.33 The Court stated that
"principal" means "in substantial part."34 To interpret the Act as only cov-
ering lobbyists who spend most of their time lobbying would, in the words
of the Court, "seriously impair the effectiveness of the Act in coping with
the problem it was designed to alleviate."35 The Court, therefore, essential-
ly rewrote the Act so that it applied to persons who solicit, collect, or re-
ceive contributions with a substantial purpose to influence legislation
through direct communication with congressional members.36
30 Id. at 619.
11 Id. at 620.
32 It is interesting to note that the Court considered an "artificially stimulated letter
campaign" to be direct communication with members of Congress. Id. at 620. Such a
letter campaign could be considered grassroots lobbying-an activity declared by many
to be outside the scope of the Act. See S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 4 n.3.
The contention that grassroots lobbying is not covered by the Act is a weapon used
by both sides of the lobby reform debate. Those in favor of reform cite the lack of
coverage of grassroots lobbying as a glaring omission that should be corrected. See id.
The Republican-led filibuster that killed Senate Bill 349 was ostensibly for the purpose
of protecting grassroots lobbying from onerous reporting requirements. See Michael
Weisskopf, Senate Republicans Block Lobbyist Reform Measure, WASH. POST, Oct. 6,
1994, at Al. If, as the Supreme Court suggested, the current statute covers grassroots
lobbying activities, then the justification for lobby reform as well as the grounds for
opposition to reform fall on weak footing. The apparent inconsistency probably can be
explained by the fact that not all grassroots lobbying can be described as an "artificially
stimulated letter campaign." See Hearings, supra note 17. Furthermore, Republican op-
position to Senate Bill 349 might be better interpreted as a political ploy to defeat a
Democratic initiative in the face of upcoming elections. See Weisskopf, supra, at Al.
" Harriss, 347 U.S. at 620-23
34 Id. at 622.
31 Id. at 623. Again, the justifications sometimes advanced for lobby reform do not
coincide with the Supreme Court's ruling in Harriss. The Committee Report accompa-
nying Senate Bill 349 states that the gaps in the Act could be interpreted to mean that
only those people who spend a majority of their time lobbying are covered. S. REP. NO.
37, supra note 15, at 4. This interpretation, of course, was explicitly rejected by the
Court in Harriss. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 623.
36 Harriss, 347 U.S. at 623.
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Proponents of lobby reform claim that the Act, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, leaves several loopholes that impair the effectiveness of the
Act. The Act fails to cover lobbying of executive branch officials.37 The
Act purportedly covers only efforts "to influence the passage or defeat of
legislation in Congress-not other activities of Members and staff. '3 The
Act also does not apply to lobbying of congressional staff, instead covering
only direct contacts with members of Congress. 39 Furthermore, the Act has
been interpreted to cover only those persons whose principal purpose is
lobbying. Finally, proponents of lobby reform claim that the Act does not
cover grassroots lobbying.'
These gaps in coverage enable numerous lobbyists to avoid registration
requirements. Consequently, many people who engage in activities common-
ly acknowledged as lobbying do not register under the Act.41 The failure of
these lobbyists to register is a result of the narrow coverage of the Act, not
of the lobbyists' disregard for the law.42 Other problems with the Act in-
37 S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 3.
31 Id. The Act, however, broadly defines legislation as including "bills, resolutions,
amendments, nominations, and other matters pending or proposed" in Congress. 2
U.S.C. § 261(e) (1994).
" S. REP. NO. 37, supra note 15, at 3. One commentator has argued that this inter-
pretation is incorrect because the Act, the context of the limiting language in Harriss,
and subsequent case law, do not distinguish between staff and members. Stanley M.
Brand et al., Disclosing "Lobbying" Activities: A Critical Examination of the Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act and the Byrd Amendment, 45 ADMIN. L. REv. 343, 348-49
(1993). Regardless of whether interpreting the Act to exclude contacts with committees
and staff is logical, it is so construed by the government and lobbyists. Thus, this justi-
fication for lobby reform remains valid as long as the Act remains in its present form.
4 See supra note 32.
4' S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 4. The General Accounting Office found that
10,000 of the 13,500 individuals and organizations listed in the book Washington Rep-
resentatives were not registered. Id. A survey of those unregistered individuals found
that three quarters of those were engaged in activities similar to those ostensibly cov-
ered by the Act. Id. The law has been criticized by lawmakers, lobbyists, and commen-
tators as meaningless. See Fuller, supra note 21, at 427. But see James M. Demarco,
Note, Lobbying the Legislature in the Republic: Why Lobby Reform is Unimportant, 8
NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 599, 624 (1994) (arguing that "the Senate has
offered no indication that enforcement [of the 1946 Act] has been lax in the past").
Demarco never discusses the bold testimony of a representative of the Department of
Justice that "[t]he Department has not changed its opinion that the 1946 Lobbying Act
is ineffective, inadequate, and unenforceable." S" REP. No. 161, supra note 5, at 53.
42 S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 4. This conclusion is questionable considering
that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected interpretations of the Act that result in several
of these "loopholes." See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
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clude the accuracy of the disclosed contribution figures,43 ineffective ad-
ministration," and ineffective enforcement of the Act.4'
Congress soon recognized the problems with the Act.' Despite several
attempts, however, the Act was never reformed.47 Lobbyists' concerns over
their First Amendment rights helped to defeat reform attempts in the
1970s.4
B. Recent Attempts at Lobby Reform
The most recent attempt at overhauling the lobbying regulation system
was the failed Senate Bill 34949 and its successor in the 104th Congress,
Senate Bill 1060.5o Senate Bill 1060 had its origins in the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Oversight of Government Management during its investigation of
the Wedtech scandal." In 1987, the Subcommittee investigated "improper
activities in the award of federal contracts to the Wedtech Corporation." 2
The Subcommittee noted that Wedtech had hired numerous lobbyists "to
assist it in obtaining favored treatment from the federal government."53 The
Subcommittee's 1988 report "affirmed the importance of public disclosure
of lobbying activities as a means of discouraging such questionable activi-
" Lobby-reform proponents argue that expenses actually reported by lobbyists are
well below actual figures. S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 5. This discrepancy is a
result of failure to comply with the Act's disclosure requirements. In addition, the nar-
row scope of the Act leads to deflated numbers even when there is full compliance. Id.
at 5-6.
" There is no governmental body with the power to interpret the requirements of the
Act and give guidance to registrants. Id. at 6-7. Consequently, lobbyists are free to
interpret the Act themselves, exacerbating the already narrow coverage. See id. at 7.
" The Department of Justice views the Act as "ineffective, inadequate, and unen-
forceable." Id. Consequently, criminal prosecutions are all but nonexistent, and civil
penalties are not authorized under the Act. Id.
' Congress established hearings in 1950 to examine the weaknesses of the Act. S.
REP. No. 161, supra note 5, at 44. These hearings, known as the Buchanan Hearings,
documented the weaknesses resulting from the poor draftsmanship of the Act. Id. at 44-
45.
47 Id. at 46-50.
41 Id. at 48-49.
9 S. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
50 S. 1060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
5 S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 19.
52 id.
53 id.
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ties."'54 The Subcommittee proceeded to review the existing lobbying laws,
and held hearings on them in 1991."
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) introduced the first version of the Lobbying
Disclosure Act 6 on February 27, 1992.17 It was revised and re-introduced
as Senate Bill 2766 on May 21, 1992."8 On June 25, 1992, the Committee
on Governmental Affairs reported favorably on Senate Bill 2766, adding
only three amendments.5 Nevertheless, the Senate did not consider the bill
in the 102nd Congress.'
The bill re-introduced as Senate Bill 349 in the 103rd Congress,61 was
passed on May 6, 1993, by a vote of 95-2.62 The House passed the bill,
with amendments, on March 24, 1994, by a vote of 315-1 10.63 The Senate
disagreed with the House amendments and agreed to a conference. 64 The
House passed the conference report on September 29, 1994 by a vote of
306-112.65 Subsequently, the Senate could not end a filibuster before a vote
on the conference report, and the bill failed to pass before the end of the
103rd Congress." The bill has been reintroduced in the 104th Congress by
Senator Levin as Senate Bill 1060.67
5" Id. The report stated:
* The Subcommittee is troubled by the possible impropriety both in appearance and
reality that can result from the undue influence friends can bring to bear on a
• current federal employee. Public awareness of the identification of lobbyists and
the matters on which they are lobbying may help limit the abuses in this area.
Id.
11 Id. at 20.
56 S. 2279, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
5 S. REP. NO. 37, supra note 15, at 20.
5 S. 2766, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 21.
9 S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 21.
60 id. at 22.
61 id.
62 139 CONG. REc. S5579 (daily ed. May 6, 1993).
63 140 CONG. REc. H1992 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994).
Id. S5592 (daily ed. May 11, 1994).
65 Id. H10,296 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994).
6 Weisskopf, supra note 32, at Al. Senator Levin stated that the bill was defeated
for purely political reasons: "If [Representative Newt] Gingrich [R-GA] can stop this
from passing, it fits his political agenda." Id. This assertion is supported by the fact that
the same Senate that filibustered the bill in October 1994 passed the bill by a 95-2 vote
in May 1993. Id. The bill has been introduced into the 104th Congress as Senate Bill
1060. This version has a better chance of passage because the Republicans now control
a majority in both houses of Congress and thus have less need for embarrassing the
Democrats. Furthermore, Senator Levin has indicated a propensity to compromise by
deleting controversial provisions regarding grassroots lobbying. 141 CONG. REc. S331
(daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Levin).
67 S. 1060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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C. Contents
1. General Definitions
Senate Bill 1060 would require lobbyists to register with the Secretary
of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 61 Under Sen-
ate Bill 1060, a lobbyist is defined as an:
individual who is employed or retained by a client for finan-
cial or other compensation for services that include more
than one lobbying contact, other than an individual whose
lobbying activities constitute less than [twenty] percent of the
time engaged in the services provided by such individual to
that client over a six month period.69
"Lobbying activities" are defined in the bill as "lobbying contacts and ef-
forts in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning activ-
ities, research and other background work that is intended, at the time it is
performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities
of others."7
Furthermore, a "lobbying contact" includes "any oral or written commu-
nication ... to a covered [executive or legislative] branch official that is
made on behalf of a client with regard to ... the formulation, modification,
or adoption of" federal legislation, rules, regulations, executive orders, or
"any other program, policy, or position of the United States Govern-
ment." Covered executive and legislative branch officials include staff
members and lower level employees of members of Congress and congres-
72sional committees.
These definitions eliminate many of the shortcomings of the 1946 Act.
First, the broad definition of lobbying activities ensures that lobbyists con-
sider a more realistic version of their total time spent lobbying when decid-
ing if they have to report. Currently, lobbyists only have to report direct
communications with members of Congress.73 Under Senate Bill 1060, lob-
68 Id. § 4(a)(1)
69 Id. § 3(10).
70 Id. § 3(7).
71 Id. § 3(8).
72 Id. § 3(3-4).
73 See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954); see also supra notes 31-
32 and accompanying text.
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byists would have to consider all activities in support of lobbying con-
tacts.74
Another loophole addressed by the bill is the requirement under the Act
that a person's "principal purpose" be to lobby.75 Senate Bill 1060 excludes
from coverage anyone whose lobbying activities constitute less than twenty
percent of the time engaged in the services provided to a particular client.76
The bill also deals with the narrow definition of covered officials. Under
current law, only direct communications with members of Congress are
considered lobbying.77 This interpretation excludes a large number of lob-
byists because the majority of congressional lobbying activity focuses on
congressional staff.7" The bill covers all contacts with congressional staff
and certain executive branch officials.79
2. Registration and Reporting Requirements
The centerpiece of Senate Bill 1060 is its disclosure and reporting re-
quirements. If the bill were enacted, a lobbyist would be required to register
with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representa-
tives. o A de minimis test was established to allow lobbyists to avoid regis-
tration with regard to a particular client if total income from that client
related to lobbying activities does not exceed $5000 semi-annually; or, for a
lobbyist lobbying on its own behalf, if total expenses related to lobbying
activities does not exceed $20,000 semi-annually."1 The registrant must dis-
close the name, address, and place of business of (1) itself; (2) its client; (3)
any organization that contributes more than $10,000 to the lobbying activi-
ties of the registrant semi-annually and participates significantly in the plan-
ning, supervision, or control of such lobbying activities; and (4) any foreign
entity that owns twenty percent of the registrant or participates in lobbying
activities. 2 Additionally, the registrant must disclose the general issue areas
in which the registrant expects to engage in lobbying activities on behalf of
the client, specific issues that have been addressed already, or will be ad-
dressed, and the name of each employee the registrant expects will work as
a lobbyist for the particular client.8 3
74 S. 1060 § 3(7).
71 2 U.S.C. § 266 (1994). A narrow interpretation, however, of "principal purpose"
was rejected by the Supreme Court. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
76 S. 1060 § 3(10).
77 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
71 S. REP. NO. 37, supra note 15, at 29.
79 S. 1060 § 3(3)-(4).
80 Id. § 4(a)(1).
81 Id. § 4(a)(3).
82 Id. § 4(b).
83 Id.
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In addition to the initial registration, lobbyists under Senate Bill 1060
would be required to file a semi-annual report for each client.84 This report
would contain the name of the registrant, the name of the client, and an
update of information on the initial registration form. 5 The report also
would contain: (1) "specific issues upon which a lobbyist ... engaged in
lobbying activities, including ... bill numbers and references to specific
executive branch actions"; (2) "a statement of the Houses of Congress and
the Federal agencies contacted ... on behalf of the client"; (3) "a list of the
employees of the registrant who acted as lobbyists on behalf of the client";
and (4) "a description of the interest ... of any foreign entity ... in the
specific issues listed" previously.8 6 An estimate of the total income re-
ceived by or on behalf of a client related to lobbying activities also would
be included in the report.8 7 The bill that failed passage in the 103rd Con-
gress would have required lobbyists to disclose the names and addresses of
persons or entities who paid the lobbyist on behalf of the client.88
D. The Future of Lobby Reform
The Republican victories in both houses of Congress leave the bill in an
uncertain position. Although the filibuster that prevented passage of Senate
Bill 349 was Republican-led, the bill enjoyed bipartisan support prior to the
last days of the 103rd Congress. 9 Consequently, the Republican opposition
to Senate Bill 349 is probably better understood as a political maneuver
designed to prevent a democratic "achievement" on the eve of the 1994
election rather than as true opposition to the contents of the bill.9 Senate
Bill 1060 passed the Senate by a vote of 98-0 on July 25, 1995."' Because
the bill received bipartisan support prior to the election and in the current
Congress, the future of lobby reform is somewhat promising.9"
84 Id. § 5(a).
8 Id. § 5(b).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 S. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 105(a)(5) (1994). This provision was deleted from
Senate Bill 1060 because of First Amendment concerns. See infra note 220 and accom-
panying text. Whether the final version of the bill will require disclosure of persons
who pay lobbyists on behalf of a client remains to be seen.
89 See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
o See Weisskopf, supra note 32, at Al; see also supra note 66.
91 141 CONG. REC. S10,599 (daily ed. July 25, 1995).
92 Furthermore, the most recent version omits provisions regarding grassroots lobby-
ing and disclosure of contributors. See 141 CONG. REc. S331 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Levin). Because reinterpretation of these provisions was purportedly
the reason for the bill's failure in the 103d Congress, the earlier widespread support of
the bill could reemerge.
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II. ANALYSIS
Senate Bill 1060 implicates the constitutional right to petition the gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances and the freedom of association implicit
in the First Amendment. 3 Because both rights fall under the First Amend-
ment, the judicial analysis of laws affecting these rights is similar. Unfortu-
nately, many of the court decisions addressing state lobby laws have failed
to differentiate between the two distinct constitutional rights, with the result
being unsatisfactory. The Supreme Court must clarify the issue by re-exam-
ining lobby reform laws and declaring which rights are implicated and
which tests are to be applied.
A. Right to Petition Government
1. Supreme Court Analysis
At first glance, the activities of lobbyists would appear to be protected
explicitly by the First Amendment's guarantee of the.right to petition the
government for redress of grievances.94 The Supreme Court, however, has
not yet recognized a constitutional right to lobby.95
An important symbol of bipartisan support of lobby reform in general occurred
when Democratic President Bill Clinton and Republican Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives Newt Gingrich met in New Hampshire on June 11, 1995. See Ann Devroy,
Clinton, Gingrich Play Down Disputes: Air of Civility Marks Historic Meeting, WASH.
POST, June 12, 1995, at Al. During this meeting, the two political leaders agreed to
appoint a panel to propose reform of lobbying rules. Id. Meanwhile, Senate Bill 1060
received unanimous support while passing the Senate. The Bill's prospects in the House
are unclear, as at least one House leader expressed doubt that the Bill could be passed
this year. Dewar & Weisskopf, supra note 8, at A4.
" See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9' Id. One commentator has argued that lobbying is simply a means of petitioning
the government and is thus clearly protected by the Constitution. See Andrew P. Thom-
as, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right to Lobby,
16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149 (1993). A petition, however, was originally a specific
procedure by which a citizen formally asked for and received legislative consideration
of an issue. Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government
for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 142-43 (1986); Julie M. Spanbauer,
The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut
from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 26-34 (1993). Under an original
intent analysis of the right to petition clause, it is by no means clear that lobbying in its
current form is explicitly covered by the First Amendment.
9' See Thomas, supra note 94, at 191-93.
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The Court first had the opportunity to address constitutional rights in-
volved with lobbyists in United States v. Rumely.96 The defendant was con-
victed of failing to answer questions before a congressional committee in-
vestigating lobbying and the 1946 Act.97 The issue before the Court was
whether the congressional committee had exceeded its authority by requiring
a publisher to disclose the names of those who made bulk purchases of
books.98 The Court held that the resolution empowering the committee did
not authorize investigation into all activities of anyone intending to influence
legislation.99
Rumely has been hailed as "an important advancement toward a fully
refined conception of lobbyists' First Amendment* rights."'" One commen-
tator argues that "Rumely was the Court's first... acknowledgment that
lobbying is entitled to some [form of] protection [under the] First Amend-
ment..... Nevertheless, any reference to First Amendment rights clearly
was to the freedoms of speech and the press. 2 The Court referred to
Rumely's activities as attempting to "influence private opinion through
books and periodicals."'0' 3 Indeed, the fact that the Court overturned
Rumely's conviction meant that his activities were not "lobbying activi-
ties."'0 4 Thus, Rumely hardly can be described as a decision involving
lobbyists' rights or the right to petition the government.
The Court next addressed the constitutionality of the Federal Regulation
of Lobbying Act of 1946 in United States v. Harriss. The defendants were
charged with violating the Act's reporting provisions.0 5 They attacked the
statute on three grounds. First, the defendants alleged that the Act was "too
vague and indefinite to meet the requirements of due process."'" Initially,
the Court stated that it had a duty to read the statute in a manner to make it
constitutionally definite. 7 The problem was that the Act applied to a
person ... who ... directly or indirectly, solicits, collects,
or receives money or any other thing of value to be used
principally to aid, or the principal purpose of which person is
96 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
97 id. at 42.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 47-48.
00 Thomas,'supra note 94, at 161.
101 Id.
112 See Rumely, 345 U.S. at 57-58 (Douglas, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 46.
104 Id. at 44-45.
"05 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 614-17 (1954).
106 Id. at 617.
107 Id. at 618.
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to aid, in the accomplishment of... [t]he passage or defeat
of any legislation by the Congress of the United States."8
The Court read this section to refer to lobbying only as "direct communica-
tion with members of Congress on pending or proposed federal legisla-
tion." °9 Construed in this manner, the Court found the Act to be constitu-
tionally definite.1
The defendants' second and third arguments were generally that the re-
porting and registration requirements of the Act violated freedoms guaran-
teed by the First Amendment-freedom to speak, publish, and to petition
the government. "' The Court first described the vital public purpose of the
Act as preventing the "evil" of "special interest groups seeking favored
treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal."'12 The
Court then explained that the Act did not prohibit special interest group
activities, but only collected information.3 Thus, Congress used its power
"in a manner restricted to its appropriate end." 4
The Court's cursory treatment of the First Amendment did little to ex-
plain the constitutional standing of the right to lobby. The Court rejected the
proposition that the Act deterred exercise of First Amendment rights because
such restraint was "at most an indirect one resulting from self-censorship,
comparable in many ways to the restraint resulting from criminal libel
laws.""..5 The Court's decision focused on vagueness and only barely ad-
dressed the issue of the right to petition the government. When it addressed
the First Amendment, it lumped together for purposes of analysis the free-
doms of speech, press, and petition."6 The Court used a relaxed scrutiny
test in that it emphasized the fact that Congress was not prohibiting lobby-
ing, but was merely collecting information." 7 The Court accepted the
government's asserted interest of maintaining the integrity of a basic gov-
ernmental process as vital."'
Although the decision in Harriss confirmed Congress's right to require
disclosure of lobbying activities, its precedential value was limited. The
Court recited a vital public interest for the Act, and declared that the Act
narrowly achieved that purpose, but the Court did not apply strict scrutiny to
08 Id. at 618-19 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 266 (1994)).
109 Id. at 620.
I10 d. at 624.
I. Id. at 625.
112 Id. at 625-26.
113 Id. at 625.
14 Id. at 626.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 625.
117 Id.
"8 Id. at 625-26.
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the Act. Instead, the Court appeared to examine the Act as a time, place,
and manner restriction.1 9 Furthermore, the Court's cursory treatment of
the implicated First Amendment rights did little to elucidate the constitution-
al protection of lobbying.
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation,20 the Court considered a
statute that denied tax exempt status to organizations that engage in substan-
tial lobbying activities."' The Court rejected the argument that the statute
infringed on any First Amendment rights because the government is not
required to subsidize constitutional rights.22 Because no First Amendment
rights were found to be implicated by the statute, the Court applied a ratio-
nal basis test to uphold the statute's validity."2 Although the majority did
not address the constitutional right to petition the government, Justice
Blackmun did so in his concurrence. Justice Blackmun briefly stated that
"lobbying is protected by the First Amendment." '24 This was the first ex-
plicit recognition by the Supreme Court of a constitutional right to lobby.
Justice Blackmun failed to expand on his statement, leaving its precedential
value in question.
Despite Justice Blackmun's statement in Regan, the Court never has
expressly created a constitutional right to lobby based on the First
Amendment's guarantee of the right to petition the government. The Court's
only extensive treatment of lobbying, Harriss, confirmed Congress's power
to require registration of lobbyists. The lack of a clear analytical framework
for cases involving lobbying has led to numerous lower court decisions
addressing the issue.
2. Lower Courts' Analyses
Every state has some form of law regulating lobbyists."2 Consequent-
ly, there have been several lower court challenges to state laws regulating
119 The Court stated that Congress had not sought to prohibit lobbying; instead, "[iut
has merely provided a modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to
influence legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose." Id. at 625. By
characterizing the Act as having a minimal effect on lobbyists' First Amendment rights,
the Court was able to hold that the Act did not violate the First Amendment.
120 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
121 Id. at 542.
122 Id. at 546.
23 Id. at 547-48.
4 d. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
125 Thomas, supra note 94, at 176. Thomas stated that Delaware did not have a law
regarding lobbyists. Id. Subsequent to Thomas's article, Delaware passed a law requir-
ing lobbyist registration and reporting. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 5831-5837 (Supp.
1994) (effective Jan. 15, 1996).
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lobbyists. Many of these cases directly address the constitutional right to
lobby or the right to petition the government for redress of grievances.
Because the Supreme Court never has clarified the constitutional stand-
ing of lobbying, the level of scrutiny that will be applied to laws that affect
lobbying is unclear. One alternative is to apply strict scrutiny, to any law
affecting lobbying. At the other extreme is to subject such laws to rational
basis review. Neither alternative is logical or sound as a policy matter. The
lack of public confidence in the federal government and the scandals involv-
ing lobbyists demonstrate the clear need for regulation of lobbyists. Judicial
declaration of a strict scrutiny test for laws affecting lobbying would severe-
ly hamper much-needed reforms. On the other hand, the right to petition the
government is a fundamental element of the First Amendment. Allowing
Congress to restrict the right to petition without the possibility of probing
judicial scrutiny could lead to the curtailment of individual liberties. Arising
out of the lower court decisions is a test that provides a sound analytical
framework for the constitutional analysis of lobbying disclosure laws.
The California Supreme Court enunciated its test for examining the
constitutionality of laws affecting lobbying in Fair Political Practices Com-
mission v. Superior Court.26  This case involved a challenge to
California's Political Reform Act of 1974.27 In examining the lobbyist
registration and reporting provisions, the court first considered which consti-
tutional test it would apply. It stated that the right to petition the govern-
ment for a redress of grievances is a fundamental right.12 Nevertheless,
the court recognized that "not every limitation or incidental burden on a
fundamental right is subject to the strict scrutiny standard. When the regula-
tion merely has an incidental effect on exercise of protected rights, strict
scrutiny is not applied." 29 This case is significant in that it lays the analyt-
ic groundwork for considering the constitutionality of lobby laws. According
to the California Supreme Court, if the law does not significantly interfere
with the right to petition the government, then the law is subjected to a
rational basis test. 3' By comparison, if a law has an appreciable impact on
the right to petition, the law is subjected to strict scrutiny."'
126 599 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1979),'cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).
127 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 81000-81016 (West 1983).
128 Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 599 P.2d at 53. The court noted that "the
lobbyist's function obviously is to exercise [the right to petition the government for a
redress of grievances] on behalf of his employer." Id. It is far from obvious, however,
that lobbying is the exercise of the right to petition in its original form. See supra note
94. The natural tendency of courts and commentators, though, appears to be to analyze
lobbying under the petition clause-thus necessitating discussion of the issue.
129 Id. at 53.
1 30 Id. at 53-54.
131 See id. at 54.
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The lower court decisions examining statutes that affect lobbying vary in
their outcomes. Fair Political Practices Commission is important because it
was the only case to strike down a lobbying reporting requirement based on
the First Amendment right to petition the government. The statute at issue
required lobbyists to register and report all payments for lobbying activities,
the names of those who supplied the funds, disbursements from the funds
received, and any transactions with government officials.'32 The statute re-
quired lobbyists to report "any transaction totalling [more than $500]...
with business entities in which the lobbyist kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to know
a [government official was] a proprietor, partner, director, officer, or manag-
er.' '1 33 The court first sustained the registration and reporting of expendi-
tures requirements, stating that these requirements did not substantially
interfere with the lobbyist's ability to petition the government.
134
Turning to the requirement that lobbyists report transactions that involve
business with government officials, the court held that the onerous reporting
requirements could lead to deterrence of lobbying.135 The reporting re-
quirements were onerous because they required reporting of transactions
wholly unrelated to lobbying activities. 36 Because the reporting require-
ments significantly burdened the right to petition, the court applied strict
scrutiny and struck them. 37 Thus, according to Fair Political Practices
Commission, a reporting requirement for any transactions with businesses in
which government officials have an interest interferes impermissibly with
the lobbyist's right to petition.
The Washington Supreme Court upheld lobbyist registration and report-
ing requirements in Fritz v. Gorton.'38 The court first discussed the right
to petition the government, noting that the right is "one of the cornerstones
of our constitutional democracy.' '139 The court stated, "the role of the lob-
byist in openly and appropriately communicating with government in regard
to legislation and other related functions of government is clearly assured
and protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment right to petition government."'
Nevertheless, the court upheld registration and reporting requirements simi-
lar to those upheld in Fair Political Practices Commission.4' Although the
132 Id.
133 id.
131 Id. at 54. The court stated that "requiring a person engaged in a business to de-
scribe it and to report its receipts and expenses may not be viewed in our commercial
society as a substantial impediment to engaging in that business." Id.
,35 Id. at 54-55.
136 Id. at 54.
31 Id. at 55.
138 517 P.2d 911 (Wash.), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902 (1974).
"' Id. at 929.
140 Id.
14' Id. at 931. The Washington law required, among other things, disclosure of the
[Vol. 4:2
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOBBY REFORM
court never explicitly stated which constitutional test it had used, it clearly
applied a minimal rational basis review. 42
Another case that examined registration and reporting requirements for
lobbyists was ACLU v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commis-
sion.43 The federal district court first considered New Jersey's registration
and reporting requirements together in determining their impact on freedom
of speech and the right to petition.'" The court stated: "Freedom of speech
and the right to petition for the redress of grievances are 'among the most
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.""' 45 Conse-
quently, the state was required to show that it had chosen the least restric-
tive means to further a compelling interest.'" The court recited three state
interests behind the law. The first interest is the need for public officials to
understand and evaluate the positions of particular constituencies on particu-
lar issues."4 Second, the electorate is served by regulation of lobbying by
allowing it to evaluate the performance of elected officials." Finally, the
state has an interest in "promoting openness in the system by which its laws
are created."'49
The court then turned to the means used to reach those ends, and noted
that "disclosure requirements are probably the least restrictive means of
serving those interests."'"5 According to the court, the outcome would have
been different if the statute was read literally so that activities unrelated to
lobbying were required to be reported.' Thus, the court followed the rul-
ing in Fair Political Practices Commission by asserting that reporting re-
quirements that cover activities unrelated to lobbying will be struck, but
other registration and reporting requirements will be upheld.
name and address of the lobbyist's employer; the lobbyist's compensation; the general
subject of the lobbyist's legislative interest; if the lobbyist's employer was an entity, the
name and address of each member of such entity whose payments to the entity exceed
$500 annually, and itemized expenditures. Id. at 927 n.4.
42 The court stated that "there is a rational nexus between a legitimate societal pur-
pose of the electorate and the requirements of [the reporting provisions]." Id. at 931.
Furthermore, the court never discussed whether the provisions were narrowly tailored or
whether they were overbroad-the infirmity that doomed some of the reporting require-
ments in Fair Political Practices Commission.
141 509 F. Supp. 1123 (D.N.J. 1981).
I' d. at 1128.
145 Id. (citing District 12, UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222
(1967)).
'46 Id. at 1129.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1130.
' Id. at 1130 n.18.
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Finally, another case that examined registration and reporting require-
ments was Commission on Independent Colleges & Universities v. New York
Temporary State Commission on Regulation of Lobbying.52 In this case,
the court held that the New York Lobbying Act,'53 which required lobby-
ists to register annually and report quarterly, was not unconstitutionally
vague.'54 This case is particularly muddled in its reasoning because it com-
bined many of the First Amendment rights together in its analysis. The court
first stated that under overbreadth analysis, laws that have an incidental
impact on speech are not subjected to strict scrutiny.'55 Furthermore, "lob-
by disclosure laws are traditionally subject to less scrutiny than laws that
sanction 'pure speech.""'f56
Applying the reduced scrutiny test, the court first found that the public
interest in the lobby law was to "apprise the public of the sources of pres-
sure on government officials."'57 The plaintiffs then claimed the law was
overbroad in several respects.'58 Their argument was that the law reached
indirect, as well as direct, lobbying.'59 The court held that the lobby law
was to be read to cover the same activities as those defined in Harriss, and
was thus confined to direct lobbying."6
This case differed from the others that examined registration and report-
ing requirements for lobbyists in that it did not even profess to apply height-
ened scrutiny. The basis for the court's use of a lower standard of review
was the distinction between laws which regulate the content of speech and
those which only have an incidental impact on First Amendment rights.' 6'
Once strict scrutiny was rejected, the court was free to discard the plaintiffs'
arguments. This case supports the analysis of Fair Political Practices Com-
mission in that lobby laws will be subject to strict scrutiny only if they
interfere substantially with the right to petition the government. Mere regis-
5. 534 F. Supp. 489 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
153 N.Y. LEGIS. LAW §§ 1-16 (Consol. 1979).
154 Commission on Indep. Colleges & Univs., 534 F. Supp. at 503. The court also ex-
amined whether the law had a chilling effect on First Amendment rights. Id. The court
stated that any chilling effect described by the plaintiff fell "largely into the category of
self-censorship as outlined in United States v. Harriss." Id. at 498. There was no factual
indication of economic reprisals, loss of employment, threats, or other manifestations of
hostility, as was found in NAACP v. Alabama. Id.; see infra notes 162-68 and accompa-
nying text.
55 Commission on Indep. Colleges & Univs., 534 F. Supp. at 493.
56 Id. at 494 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
'57 Id. at 494-95.
'5 See id. at 495-96.
'5 Id. at 497.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 493.
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tration and reporting requirements do not interfere substantially with any
First Amendment rights.
From these cases, one can determine that lobbyist registration and re-
porting laws will be subjected to minimal scrutiny if they do not signifi-
cantly burden the lobbyist's right to petition. On the one hand, requiring
reporting of transactions with government officials does not burden lobby-
ists, and will be subjected to minimal scrutiny. On the other hand, reporting
requirements of transactions with non-governmental entities will be consid-
ered overbroad and burdensome. These provisions will be subjected to strict
scrutiny, and likely stricken.
B. Right of Association
Another analytical framework that is pertinent to lobby laws is the judi-
cial treatment of laws affecting the right to freedom of association. This
analysis has not been applied to lobby laws by the Supreme Court. Never-
theless, the rationale and logic is applicable in the context of laws that regu-
late lobbying. Accordingly, several lower courts that have examined lobby
laws based their decisions in whole or in part on the freedom of association.
1. The Supreme Court's Analysis of Freedom of Association
In the landmark case of NAACP v. Alabama,'62 the Court first recog-
nized the right of freedom of association. The issue before the Court was
whether the state could compel the NAACP to disclose its membership lists
to the Alabama Attorney General without regard to the position or function
of the members in the NAACP.'63 Turning to the merits, the Court de-
clared: "It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty'
assured by the... Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech."'" Thus, "state action which may have the effect of curtailing the
freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."15
The Court stated that compelled disclosure of membership in groups
could be an effective restraint on freedom of association."6 Here, the
NAACP demonstrated that disclosure of the identity of its members had
"exposed [them] to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physi-
cal coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility."' 67 The Court
162 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
163 Id. at 451.
164 Id. at 460.
165 Id. at 460-61.
166 Id. at 462.
167 Id.
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then found that compelled disclosure acted as a restraint on the effectiveness
of the group's ability to advocate.16
This case was important because of its broad language describing the
dangers of mandatory disclosure. At the most, the Court held that forced
disclosure of any kind could interfere with the freedom of association. Read
narrowly, however, the holding seems to require a factual showing that
disclosure would have a deterrent effect on the freedom of association.
The next major case in the associational privacy line was Buckley v.
Valeo,6 9 which presented an extensive challenge to the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971. The Act required political committees to keep re-
cords of contributions, including the names and addresses of contribu-
tors. 7' The political committees also were required to file reports with the
Federal Election Commission that identified the source of contributions
greater than $100.11
As a preliminary matter, the Court reaffirmed that "compelled disclo-
sure ... can seriously infringe on privacy of association." '  The Court
explained that disclosure of contributors can invade privacy of belief as
much as disclosure of membership lists.'73 The Court then examined the
state interests in the disclosure of contributors. First, disclosures aid the
voters in evaluating the candidates. 74 Second, disclosure deters actual and
perceived corruption.'75 Finally, reporting and disclosure requirements are
necessary to detect violations of contribution limits. 176
The Court then considered whether the purported public interests out-
weighed any actual harm to First Amendment rights. The Court described
NAACP v. Alabama as requiring a requisite factual showing of harm to
members of an organization that sought to protect its membership lists. 177
Here, the appellants offered no such proof, and any infringement on First
'68 Id. at 463.
169 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
170 Id. at 61.
171 Id. at 63.
172 Id. at 64.
'3 Id. at 66.
'74 Id. at 66-67.
'71 Id. at 67.
176 Id. at 68.
117 Id. at 69 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)). The Court reaf-
firmed the rule that a challenger to disclosure provisions must show actual harm in
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87 (1982). The Social-
ist Workers Party was exempted from campaign disclosure requirements that would
have forced disclosure of the names of each contributor and each recipient of campaign
funds. Id. at 89. The Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the government
from compelling disclosures by a party that can show a reasonable probability that the
compelled disclosures will subject those identified to threats, harassment, or reprisals.
Id. at 101.
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Amendment rights was highly speculative. 7 ' Consequently, the disclosure
and reporting provisions were upheld.'79
The Buckley decision is also uncertain in its applicability to lobbying.
This case held that the state had a compelling interest in requiring disclo-
sure, preventing corruption, detecting corruption, and facilitating a public
evaluation of candidates. These interests, of course, are similar to those
implicated in lobby reform. 8° Buckley also stands for the proposition that
encroachment into the freedom of association must be proven with factual
evidence.' If an organization is able to prove that disclosure of its mem-
bership/contributor lists would have a chilling effect on its advocacy, then
the law will be subject to strict scrutiny. 2
178 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70.
79 Id. at 84.
,so S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 23; see also supra notes 147-49, 157 and ac-
companying text. But see Mary K. Vanderbeck, Note, First Amendment Constraints on
Reform of the Federal Regulation 'of Lobbying Act, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1219, 1230-35
(1979) (arguing that the state interest of deterring corruption does not apply to lobby
disclosure laws). For a general discussion of the benefits of disclosure, see Seth F.
Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Dis-
closure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 72-108 (1991).
The Court recently reaffirmed the rule that disclosure achieves the compelling state
interest of deterring corruption. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 115 S. Ct.
1511 (1995), the Court held unconstitutional an Ohio law that prohibited distribution of
campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person issuing the
literature. In holding that the Ohio law's interest in preventing fraud and libel was not
compelling, the Court cited Harriss and Buckley as cases in which the state interest of
deterring corruption or the appearance of corruption was compelling. Id. at 1523 &
n.20. The Court also implied that disclosure of campaign expenditures and lobbying
activities achieved the permissible goal of deterring corruption. Id.
,s The Court emphasized that a party must be afforded flexibility in proving the
requisite harm. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74. "The evidence ... need show only a reason-
able probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will
subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either [g]overnment officials or
private parties." Id. Some parties have been able to successfully argue that they would
be exposed to threat by compelled disclosure. David K. Neidert, Comment, Campaign
Reform: Fifteen Years After Buckley v. Valeo, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 289, 300 (1991).
These parties, however, are still required to disclose expenditures. Id.
82 At least one commentator has argued that lobby reform measures would fail a
facial challenge based on associational privacy. See David E. Landau, Public Disclosure
of Lobbying: Congress and Associational Privacy After Buckley v. Valeo, 22 How. L.J.
27, 43-44 (1979). The argument is that lobby reform serves no compelling government
interest because Congress has failed to establish a factual record of abuses that would
call for lobby reform. Id. at 43-44. However, the proponents of Senate Bill 1060 have
compiled such a record of abuses, as well as an examination of the ineffectiveness of
current lobby law. S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 2-6.
1995]
740 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 4:2
2. Lower Courts
The state court decisions that examine lobbying disclosure laws in light
of freedom of association rights tend to be more severe in their treatment of
the laws than federal court decisions. One such decision is Montana Auto-
mobile Ass'n v. Greely.'83 One part of this decision dealt with a statutory
provision that required reporting of any contributor who contributed more
than $250 per year "regardless of whether [the money was] solely for the
purposes of lobbying."'' 4 The court stated that compelled disclosure affect-
ed associational privacy, and that the provision was written so broadly as to
violate that freedom.'85 The disclosure of contributors, regardless of wheth-
er the money was earmarked for lobbying, compelled disclosure of informa-
tion unrelated to the ends that the lobbying statute sought to achieve.186
The court thus struck the language that required reporting regardless of
whether the money was used for lobbying.'87 This decision was important
because it went beyond the scope of Buckley to hold that disclosure of con-
tributors violates the freedom of association, even though no chilling effect
on constitutional rights was shown by the plaintiffs.
A similar case was Pletz v. Austin,'88 which dealt with a challenge to
Michigan's lobby law. One provision of the law required disclosure of the
identities of contributors to lobbying organizations. 89 The court upheld the
trial court's determination that this provision was unconstitutional, applying
strict scrutiny to the provision because of its impact on the freedom of asso-
ciation."' Curiously, the court never addressed the state interests in the
provision, and observed simply that the disclosure "potentially would dis-
courage individuals from associating with organizations devoted to lobby-
ing."'' This case stands for the proposition that strict scrutiny sometimes
will be applied to lobbying disclosure provisions. The plaintiffs in Pletz did
not show the requisite chilling effect on their associational rights.
Another case demonstrated a willingness to require a factual showing of
a chilling effect consistent with Buckley. Minnesota State Ethical Practices
Board v. National Rifle Ass'n'92 involved a challenge to state law provi-
183 632 P.2d 300 (Mont. 1981).
,84 Id. at 310.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 336 N.W.2d 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
19 Id. at 803.
190 Id. at 804.
191 Id.
192 761 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986).
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sions requiring registration of lobbyists and disclosure of contributors.193
The court failed to differentiate between the different First Amendment
rights in its analysis, so whether the analysis focused on freedom of associa-
tion or the right to petition the government is unclear. 94
Relying on Harriss, the court found that the state had a compelling
interest in requiring lobbyists to register, 95 and that the state interest out-
weighed any infringement on First Amendment rights because the provision
paralleled the one upheld in Buckley.'96 Furthermore, the state law provid-
ed an exemption for the lobbyists who could "demonstrate[] by clear and
convincing evidence that disclosure would expose them to economic repri-
sals, loss of employment, or threat of physical coercion."'1 97
National Rifle Ass'n is probably the most loyal to Buckley in requiring a
factual determination of a chilling effect on associational rights before a
strict scrutiny standard will be applied. This case also is useful for its clear
application of Buckley to lobby registration laws. By describing lobby reg-
istration requirements as paralleling the disclosure requirements examined in
Buckley, the court left an unambiguous precedent for other courts to follow
in applying associational privacy analysis to lobby registration laws.
Another court applied associational analysis to a law prohibiting lobby-
ists from helping in campaigns. In Barker v. Wisconsin Ethics Board,'98
the law at issue prohibited lobbyists from furnishing personal services to a
campaign.'" The court first addressed the appropriate standard of review,
concluding that the appropriate test was the "rigorous standard of review"
from Buckley."0 The court rejected a lesser time, place, and manner re-
striction test because the provision directly prohibited protected activity.2"'
The court accepted that preventing government corruption was a com-
pelling interest.2"2 Framing the issue as whether "lobbyists have greater
potential to corrupt the political process than do ordinary citizens,"2 3 the
court predictably found the provision invalid.20 4 The court stated that the
prohibition against services did not further the state interest in preventing
193 Id. at 511.
194 Id.
'9' Id. at 512 (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)).
196 Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)).
197 Id.
98 841 F. Supp. 255 (W.D. Wis. 1993).
199 Id. at 257.
200 Id. at 259.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 260.
204 Id.
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the appearance of corruption because lobbyists could still use their names in
support of candidates." 5
The court applied strict scrutiny because the law prohibited an activity
associated with the First Amendment, and it was not a mere regulation that
required disclosure of information."1 Although the decision discussed free-
dom of association, the rights described resembled the right to petition the
government, namely, influencing government. Thus, Barker demonstrated a
willingness to strike a law under the guise of associational privacy when the
right implicated by the law is more akin to petitioning the government.
These cases generally stand for the proposition that lobbyist registration
requirements which compel disclosure of members and clients could violate
associational privacy. Nevertheless, a lobbyist most likely would have to
demonstrate an actual injury, as NAACP and Buckley arguably require." 7
Reporting provisions that require disclosure of all contributors, regardless of
whether the contributions are for lobbying purposes, are probably overbroad.
Consequently, reporting provisions should be tailored to require disclosure
of only contributors to lobbying activities.
C. Application to Senate Bill 1060
1. Registration Requirements
Senate Bill 1060 requires lobbyists to register with the Secretary of the
Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives.2 8 The requirement
may be challenged as a violation of the right to petition the government for
redress of grievances guaranteed under the First Amendment. Consequently,
some would hold that any law affecting that right must be subject to strict
scrutiny. Some would argue that this argument is tenuous at best. The Court
never has stated that there is a constitutional right to lobby. Only Justice
Blackmun, concurring in Regan, made such a statement.2 9 The Court's
holding in Harriss, that Congress may require registration of lobbyists, is
still good law.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 260-61.
207 Some commentators discussing associational privacy issues with regards to lobby
disclosure fail to acknowledge the requirement of a requisite showing of injury. See
Landau, supra note 182, at 43-44 (arguing that "the first issue is whether the proposed
statute on its face complies with [exacting scrutiny]"); Thomas, supra note 94, at 166-
72 (stating that "NAACP and later cases illustrate the exacting scrutiny that courts must
now apply to any mandated disclosure, viewing all such requirements as 'constitutional-
ly suspect').
208 S. 1060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(1) (1995).
209 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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More support for the proposition that lobbying is constitutionally pro-
tected can be found in the decisions of the lower courts following Harriss.
Moffett v. Killian"' stated explicitly that lobbyists were protected by the
First Amendment."' The court applied strict scrutiny to a tax associated
with registration fees."' Montana Automobile Ass'n v. Greely2"3 struck a
contingent fee ban as being violative of the lobbyists' First Amendment
rights. These cases went beyond the Supreme Court's decisions by holding
that lobbyists are entitled to protection under the First Amendment's guaran-
tee of the right to petition. They did not address directly, however, registra-
tion requirements.
The lower court decisions that do address registration requirements for
lobbyists consistently have upheld such laws. It is only either when a state
prohibits affirmative action by a lobbyist, such as campaign contributions, or
when an actual effect on the exercise of the right to petition is shown, that
the courts will apply a higher standard of review to lobbying laws.
In the Senate bill, the registration requirements do not include a fee, as
they did in Moffett. Furthermore, the registration is related to the purposes
of the bill. The committee report stated that the registration requirements
would ensure that the public is aware of the pressures that are put on elected
officials.2 14 The registration requirements are also tailored to give more
pertinent information than is currently collected.21 In addition, the new
registration requirements are less burdensome than those currently in place
and upheld in Harriss."6 In fact, the registration requirements are no more
than an analogous version of time, place, and manner restrictions on
2 0 360 F. Supp. 228 (D. Conn. 1973).
2 Id. at 231.
212 Id. at 232.
213 632 P.2d 300, 308 (Mont. 1981).
214 S. REP. NO. 37, supra note 15, at 23.
211 Id. at 30.
216 The lobbyist would be required to disclose "only meaningful information." Id.
Such information includes "the names of lobbyists and their clients; the issues that are
lobbied; the overall amount spent on lobbying; and a list of the federal agencies and
congressional committees contacted." Id.; see also infra note 226. Requiring a business
to provide receipts and expenses is not a substantial burden. See Fair Political Practices
Comm'n v. Superior Court, 599 P.2d 46, 54 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049
(1980). Opponents of lobby reform, of course, argue the opposite: "The extensive pa-
perwork and reporting requirements may cause some groups not to participate in lobby-
ing merely because they are likely to reach the reporting threshold sooner by virtue of
their geographic location." Letter from Laura Murphy Lee to Members of the United
States Senate, supra note 9, at 1.
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speech." 7 Despite recent calls to the contrary,2"' the registration require-
ments should not be seriously challenged as a burden on the right to petition
the government.
2. Disclosure Requirements
A more serious challenge to Senate Bill 1060 is its possible impact on
the freedom of association. The ACLU, in a letter to members of Congress,
claimed that the reporting provisions would unconstitutionally require disclo-
sure of the names of contributors.2"9 In its original form, the bill required a
lobbyist to report the names of contributors in addition to the client, but it
has since omitted this requirement.2 ' Furthermore, the registration and re-
porting provisions do not apply to clients who account for less than $5000
of the lobbyist's semi-annual income. Under the original bill, an inter-
pretation requiring disclosure of all members of an organization who con-
217 A time, place, and manner restriction would be upheld if it passes a three part
test: (1) the regulation is content-neutral; (2) the regulation is "narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government [purpose];" and (3) the regulation does "not unneces-
sarily burden the ability to communicate." See 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 20.54 (2d ed. 1992). Lobby registration
is analogous to a time, place, and manner restriction on speech because it does not seek
to regulate the substance of lobbying activities, but the manner of lobbying activities.
The significance of this analogy is that a strict scrutiny test is not applied to the regis-
tration requirements because the substance of the lobbying efforts is not being regulat-
ed.
238 See Thomas, supra note 94, at 189-90.
239 Letter from Laura Murphy Lee to Members of the United States Senate, supra
note 9, at 3.
220 Compare S. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 105(b) (1994) with S. 1060, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b) (1995). The original bill required a semi-annual report to contain
the name of the lobbyist and the name of the client. S. 349 § 105(b)(1). The bill also
required the report to contain "the name, address, and principal place of business of any
person or entity other than the client who paid the registrant to lobby on behalf of the
client." Id. § 105(b)(5).
The most recent version of the bill omits the language requiring disclosure of those
who have paid the registrant to lobby on behalf of the client. S. 1060, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 5(b) (1995). This omission goes farther than necessary to protect constitutional
rights. There is a need to require the names of organizations that contribute to lobbying
coalitions. See Hearings, supra note 17. This need results because corporations or other
organizations occasionally hide their identities behind a coalition for the purpose of
preventing the public from learning of their efforts to influence legislation. S. REP. No.
37, supra note 15, at 31. It would be simple to draft a clause requiring disclosure of
coalition members without infringing upon constitutional liberties. Because Senate Bill
1060's change in the reporting requirement is unnecessary and antithetical to the goal of
public disclosure, the bill should be restored to its original form.
221 S. 1060 § 4(a)(3)(A)(i).
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tribute to its lobbying cause would make a challenge to the law based on
associational privacy more tenable.
The first hurdle that any challenge to the reporting provisions would
have to meet is the requirement of a factual showing of harm to the right of
association. This requirement, originating from Buckley and NAACP,222
would prevent a lobbyist from making a facial challenge to the reporting
provisions. If the reporting provisions are shown to substantially violate a
lobbyist's freedom of association, the court will have to decide on the stan-
dard of review. The standard of review for violations of the freedom of
association is normally strict scrutiny. The first step in determining whether
Senate Bill 1060's disclosure requirements violate constitutional freedom of
association is an evaluation of the state interest involved. The state interests
in the reporting provision include the disclosure of the pressures on the
political process and the deterrence of corruption.223 Both of these inter-
ests have been upheld repeatedly as compelling.224 Thus, the first part of
the test should be satisfied.
As to injury, a lobbyist might claim that the registration and reporting
requirements could impose a substantial burden on their lobbying activi-
ties.2" This argument does not take into account the fact that the reporting
provisions of Senate Bill 1060 are less burdensome than those in the current
Act.226 Because the more onerous reporting requirements were upheld in
222 See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
223 S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 30.
224 See supra notes 118, 147-49, 174-76, 202 and accompanying text.
225 This is the argument of the ACLU. In a letter to members of Congress, the ACLU
stated that the bill's extensive paperwork and reporting requirements may cause some
groups not to participate in lobbying. Letter from Laura Murphy Lee to Members of the
United States Senate, supra note 9, at 1.
226 The current Act requires reports to contain the names and addresses of contribu-
tors, the amount of the contributions, and the names and addresses of persons to whom
an expenditure has been made. 2 U.S.C. § 264 (1994). Current law also requires quar-
terly reporis containing an accounting of all money received and spent by the lobbyist,
to whom money was paid, for what purposes, the names of any publication in which the
lobbyist has caused to be published any articles or editorials (regardless of the content
of the articles or editorials), and the proposed legislation the lobbyist is employed to
support or oppose. Id. § 267. Senate Bill 1060, however, requires the lobbyist to report
only the names of'the clients, a list of issues lobbied, an estimate of income from a cli-
ent, and an estimate of expense related to lobbying, and then only if lobbyist lobbies on
own behalf-not on a client's behalf. S. 1060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b) (1995).
The original bill also required reporting of those who paid the lobbyist on behalf of a
client. S. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 105(b)(5) (1994). Significantly, Senate Bill 1060
omits reporting of publications. It also does not require detailed accounting of expendi-
tures or income. S. 1060 § 5(c). Instead, the report must include an estimate of expens-
es rounded to the nearest $20,000. Id. Obviously, these reporting requirements are less
burdensome than current law because they do not require detailed accounts of expendi-
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Harriss,227 a lobbyist would be hard-pressed to show an injury from Sen-
ate Bill 1060's reporting requirements.
If the challenge of showing injury is met, the reporting provision will be
examined to see if it is narrowly tailored to meet the compelling state inter-
est. The provisions in Senate Bill 1060 are narrowly tailored because they
seek only the aggregate amount of lobbying expenditures.228 Lobbyists
whose clients account for less than $5000 in income are exempt with respect
to that client-thus preventing overbroad application of the requirements to
small clients who are not as likely to corrupt the political process.
One major concern with the original form of the bill was whether lobby-
ists should be required to disclose membership lists of clients.229 As writ-
ten, the original bill would only require disclosure of contributions from
individual members of associations who separately finance lobbying activi-
ties on their own.23° The individual members would then be subject to the
$2500 de minimis test.2 1' Thus, in effect, only an organization's members
who separately contribute more than $2500 semi-annually for lobbying
would be identified. As a result, the disclosure requirements avoided the
overbreadth problems that plagued the reporting provisions in Greely.232
Furthermore, it would be difficult for such a member to show a factual
injury to freedom of association, although demonstration of such an injury
would bring the case closer to NAACP and would subject the law to stricter
scrutiny. If a similar requirement is returned to Senate Bill 1060, attention
must be given to ensure the bill's constitutionality.
The state has valid interests in preventing corruption and exposing pres-
sures on the legislature.233 The reporting requirement of the original bill
pertaining to individual contributors appeared narrowly tailored because it
only applied to the largest contributors who earmark the money for lobby-
ing. In short, the reporting provisions of Senate Bill 1060 should be able to
survive a challenge based on freedom of association.
tures and income. This streamlining of the reporting provisions is a major goal of Sen-
ate Bill 1060. S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 30-35. Finally, Senate Bill 1060 in-
cludes an exemption for lobbyists whose clients account for less than $5000 in income
during a semiannual reporting period. S. 1060 § 5(a)(2). No such exemption exists in
the current law.
227 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625-26 (1954).
228 S. 1060 § 5(b)(3).
229 See Letter from Laura Murphy Lee to Members of the United States Senate, su-
pra note 9, at 3. Such a required disclosure arguably could violate freedom of associa-
tion. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
230 S. 349 § 103(2).
23 Id. § 105(b)(3).
232 See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 118, 147-49, 174-76, 202 and accompanying text.
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Need for Lobby Reform
The need for reform of the current lobby law is obvious. The poor
draftsmanship of the 1946 Act leaves loopholes that allow most lobbyists to
evade registration."' The Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute
means that it only covers persons who solicit contributions, whose substan-
tial purpose is the defeat or passage of legislation in the United States Con-
gress, and who achieve this end only through direct communication with
members of Congress. 35
As a result of these loopholes, the Act is of little use. The GAO found
that 10,000 of the 13,500 individuals and organizations listed in the book
Washington Representatives were not registered under the Act. 6 The fail-
ure of these lobbyists to register is a result of the loopholes in the Act. 37
Furthermore, even the lobbyists that registered under the Act failed to sup-
ply much useful information. The Act does not require disclosure of the
specific bills lobbied, nor does it require disclosure of the aggregate amount
of money spent on lobbying activities. These two types of information are
the "most basic" facts needed on lobbying.23
In general, the 1946 Act does not achieve its purpose of revealing the
efforts of lobbyists to influence the government. The facts gleaned from the
Act provide a distorted picture of the influence of lobbyists. Some reform is
needed to provide a clear picture of the influence that lobbyists have on the
government. The drafters of Senate Bill 1060 intend the disclosure provi-
sions to further the goal of ensuring "that the public, federal officials, and
other interested parties are aware of the pressures that are brought to bear
on public policy."239 This public enlightenment would give interested par-
ties an opportunity to provide their views to decision makers.2" It would
also discourage lobbyists and officials from activities that might lead the
"public to believe that improper influence had been exercised,"24' a policy
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Harriss.242
234 See supra notes 16-21, 27-40, and accompanying text.
235 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 623 (1954).
236 S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 4.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 5.
239 Id. at 23.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
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B. Implications for Individual Rights
At odds with many of the justifications for lobby reform is the consider-
ation of an individual's right to petition the government. The reporting and
registration requirements may have a chilling effect on the exercise of
citizens' rights. In particular, the reporting requirements may be so onerous
as to discourage some individuals from contacting members of Congress.
Nevertheless, the de minimis test of Senate Bill 1060 mitigates this fear. A
lobbyist need not register or report with regards to a particular client if that
client accounts for less than $5000 in semi-annual income for the lobby-
ist.243 This de minimis exception allows the average citizen to contact
members of Congress without having to register or file a report. In addition,
only those lobbyists with the ability to register and file reports are required
to do so.2" Furthermore, the reporting requirements for Senate Bill 1060
are less onerous than the reporting required under current law.245
A more vexing policy issue is presented when contributors are required
to be identified.2" The fact that one's contribution to an unpopular lobby
will be made public can have the effect of discouraging such contributions.
Because many of the unpopular lobbies are small and underfunded, discour-
aging even a few donors may have significant effects. Under the original
bill, this problem was alleviated somewhat by the de minimis test.
243 S. 1060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (a)(3) (1995).
24 Because the reporting and registration provisions only apply to lobbyists with
significant income and expenditures, they cannot be heard to complain of the burden
involved in the requirements. The California Supreme Court noted this fact when decid-
ing that the registration and reporting requirements did not amount to a significant bur-
den:
While the burden of disclosure might be substantial for those engaged in exten-
sive lobbying activities, the burden is not great when viewed in the context of the
total activities engaged in. Requiring a person engaged in a business to describe it
and to report its receipts and expenses may not be viewed in our commercial
society as a substantial impediment to engaging in that business.
Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 599 P.2d 46, 54 (1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1049 (1980).
245 Senate Bill 349 would have "significantly streamline[d] disclosure requirements to
ensure that only meaningful information [was] required and needless paperwork [was]
avoided." S. REP. NO. 37, supra note 15, at 30. Additionally, Senate Bill 1060 requires
only two reports per year, compared with the currently required four reports. Compare
S. 1060 § 5 with 2 U.S.C. § 267 (1994); see also supra note 226.
246 Senate Bill 349 required disclosure of contributors. S. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 105(b)(5) (1994). The most recent version of Senate Bill 1060 eliminates this require-
ment.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Provisions of Current Bill
Several means are available to ensure that a lobby reform bill does not
run into constitutional difficulties. Some of these are already incorporated
into Senate Bill 1060. First, the vagueness problem that plagued the 1946
Act is not present in Senate Bill 1060. The Court in Harriss was troubled
that the Act failed to adequately define who was covered and for what activ-
ities.247 Senate Bill 1060 explicitly defines lobbying contacts as communi-
cations with government officials with regard to "the formulation, modifica-
tion, or adoption of" federal legislation, rules, regulations, executive orders,
"or any other program, policy, or position of the United States
government." ''4 The definitions in the bill clearly define the coverage of
its provisions, thereby eliminating any constitutional vagueness concerns.
Another constitutional infirmity avoided by Senate Bill 1060 is overbreadth.
The de minimis test exempts from reporting and registration requirements
lobbyists whose clients account for less than $5000 in semi-annual in-
come. 9 This provision helps ensure that the reporting requirements are
narrowly tailored. By focusing on the major lobbyists, Congress has avoided
the overbreadth problems associated with attempts to prevent the appearance
of impropriety by those in the least likely position to commit it.
One problem likely to be encountered by Senate Bill 1060 is the rela-
-tionship between the bill's purpose and its method of achieving that pur-
pose. If the bill is to be subjected to some form of heightened scrutiny, a
close fit must be established between the state interest and the means used
to achieve that purpose.50 Senate Bill 1060 is more narrowly tailored to
the state interest of revealing the pressures on the legislative process than is
the 1946 Act. This is because current law requires disclosure of unimportant
information,"' whereas Senate Bill 1060 requires disclosure of more perti-
nent information.252
247 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618-24 (1954).
24 S. 1060 § 3(8).
249 Id. § 4(a)(3).
250 This test, however, is unlikely to be applied unless a challenger first proves an
actual injury. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
251 For instance, a lobbyist must itemize all moneys expended. 2 U.S.C. § 267
(1994). This has led to the reporting of $6 cab fares and $16 messenger
fees-information not likely to further the public's understanding of the pressures
brought on the government. See S. REP. No. 37, supra note 15, at 4-5.
252 For instance, Senate Bill 1060 does not require itemization of expenditures, but
only a total of such expenditures. S. 1060 § 5(b)(4). Also required to be disclosed is a
list of the specific issues lobbied and the committees contacted. Id. § 5(b)(2). This in-
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One method that has not been considered under any form of the bill is
to provide an administrative procedure for a registrant to be exempted from
the reporting requirements if the registrant is able to prove that the reporting
would infringe upon any First Amendment rights. 53 Such a provision
would make overturning the statute more difficult because a registrant would
have an administrative remedy to arguably the most serious of the bill's
possible infirmities. Another advantage of such a provision is that it would
allow Congress to define the type of injury required in order to be exempt-
ed-thus eliminating uncertainty over judicial determination of injury. One
drawback to the provision would be its implicit acknowledgement that the
reporting requirements may constitute a burden on protected rights. Further-
more, a possible loophole would be created through which lobbyists could
avoid disclosure of their activities. z4
B. Right to Petition Government
Despite recent calls for a constitutionally protected right to lobby,25
the Court should not take such an extreme stance. First, the First Amend-
ment right to petition does not explicitly cover lobbying. Furthermore, such
a declaration could lead to the overturning of lobbying laws and regulations
that are found in every state. The concerns of the advocates of a constitu-
tionally protected right to lobby are met by existing jurisprudence. The right
to address the government will not be violated, as demonstrated by Fair
Political Practices Commission and Moffett.256 Furthermore, the right to
anonymously contribute to lobbyists will be protected by an associational
privacy right. The excesses of certain lobbyists clearly show that more regu-
lation of lobbying, not less, is needed.
formation is certainly useful in evaluating how much total money was spent by a lobby-
ist on a particular issue.
253 Such a provision was cited as a significant factor in upholding a state lobby re-
form law in Minnesota. Minnesota State Ethical Practices Bd. v. National Rifle Ass'n,
761 F.2d 509, 512 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986). The provision at
issue in that case provided an exemption from reporting requirements for any individual
who "demonstrate[d] by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure would expose
him to economic reprisals, loss of employment or threat of physical coercion." Id.
25 Such a loophole would be difficult to use, however, because the injury would then
have to be proved to the satisfaction of an administrative body.
1 See Thomas, supra note 94.
256 See supra notes 135-37, 210-11 and accompanying text.
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C. Freedom of Association
The Court should extend the right of association to cover lobbyists'
membership lists. It would be logically inconsistent for the Court to apply
associational privacy analysis to the disclosure of campaign contributors, but
not to the disclosure of lobbying contributors. Nevertheless, this would not
spell the end of the disclosure requirements found in the original Senate Bill
349. A court should continue to require a showing of an actual chilling
effect on the freedom of association. If this hurdle is overcome, disclosure
provisions should not be automatically overturned by strict scrutiny. Rather,
if the provisions are narrowly drawn to achieve the compelling state inter-
ests, the provisions should survive. As stated above, the $5000 de minimis
exception and the type of information required to be disclosed help achieve
the goal of narrowly tailoring the reporting provisions.
V. CONCLUSION
Senate Bill 1060 represents a much-needed attempt to reform the regula-
tion of lobbyists at the federal level. The provisions of the bill which call
for registration and reporting requirements are likely to be challenged in the
courts if the bill passes in some form next year. The courts will be able to
use one of two analytical frameworks when evaluating the constitutionality
of the bill. The first would analyze the law under the First Amendment right
to petition the government. Such an analysis might recognize a fundamental
right to lobby in the First Amendment. This analytical framework is unlikely
to be used because of existing jurisprudence. Furthermore, it is undesirable
because of the need for lobby reform and the superfluous nature of such a
judicially created right.
More appropriately, the second framework would use a freedom of asso-
ciation analysis based on NAACP and Buckley. This framework should be
narrowly construed to require the challenger to show an actual injury. If this
is done, the provisions of Senate Bill 1060 requiring disclosure of clients
should be upheld because of their narrow application 57 The drafters of
Senate Bill 1060 took many steps to ensure that the bill would survive a
judicial challenge. Their efforts have resulted in a bill that achieves the
important purpose of lobby reform without being constitutionally infirm.
STEVEN A. BROWNE
257 The provisions in the original Senate Bill 349 requiring disclosure of contributors
would probably be sustained for similar reasons.
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